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COMMERCE-CITY ORDINANCE REQUIRING A DEPOSIT ON ALL
SOFT DRINK AND BEER CONTAINERS IS NOT AN UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. BOWIE INN,
INC. V. CITY OF BOWIE, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975).
In recent years, law regulating the sale of soft drink and beer
containers have been enacted across the nation on both the state and
local level. Regardless of the method of regulation, these laws purport
to limit litter, preserve natural resources and generally improve the
environment. In achieving this goal all such anti-litter laws burden the
manufacturers, distributors and retailers in some manner. The basic
question is whether the extent of this burden on commerce is so
oppressive, discriminatory or unjustified that the legislative enactment
will be invalidated as an undue hinderance on the flow of interstate
commerce.' The Maryland Court of Appeals, when confronted with
this issue in Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie,2 upheld a city ordinance
which required a deposit on all retail sales of soft drink and beer
containers.
The trial court, despite its finding that the ordinance would adversely
affect the retailers' business, upheld the ordinance. The trial
court determined that the ordinance was rationally related to solving
litter problems in Bowie and that the alleged "severe" burdens were
"highly speculative." 3 On appeal,4 the petitioners-distributors, manu-
facturers and retailers-urged the court to apply the now traditional
balancing test.' Basically, the balancing test weighs the benefits of the
ordinance against the burdens it places on commerce.6 The petitioners
in Bowie Inn believed that the putative benefits were clearly out-
weighed by the burdens and, therefore, the ordinance should have been
found unconstitutional.
Other courts that have considered challenges to environmental
legislation have rejected the traditional application of the balancing test
finding such a test inapplicable to issues regarding the environment.7
Instead, these courts, as explained in Bowie Inn, have simply deferred
to the legislative determination as long as the ordinance is within the
legitimate exercise of the police power and is not discriminatory.' In
the six to one decision with Judge O'Donnell dissenting, deference to
1. See American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d
691 (1973), upholding a statewide mandatory deposit statute.
2. 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975).
3. Id. at 235, 335 A.2d at 682-83.
4. A writ of certiorari was granted by the Maryland Court of Appeals, by-passing a
consideration by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-201 et seq. (1974).
5. 274 Md. at 244-45, 335 A.2d at 687-88.
6. See note 29 infra.
7. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (municipal
smoke abatement ordinance); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15
Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973) (statewide mandatory deposit legislation).
8. 274 Md. at 244-46, 335 A.2d at 687-89.
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the legislature was the course adopted by the court in Bowie Inn.9
Although not applying the balancing test as urged by the petitioners,
the court did say in dicta that "[aissuming that a 'weighing test' or
'balancing approach' is applicable to a case such as this, we have no
hesitancy in concluding that the putative local benefits of the Bowie
ordinance clearly outweigh any burden which the ordinance might
impose on interstate commerce."'"
The decision in Bowie Inn should not be interpreted as giving local
governments the green light to enact, free from scrutiny, any type of
deposit law. If the court in the future applied the balancing test dictum
of Bowie Inn, then the validity of a local regulation will not only rely
upon its burdensome impact when examined in isolation, but also upon
the combined impact of all ordinances (some possibly in conflict)
enacted by different subdivisions." In other words, as different
localities pass deposit laws with conflicting regulations, these non-
conformities will increase the burden on commerce and could lead to
the invalidation of future ordinances.
The present case arose from the enactment by the Bowie City
Council of an ordinance which requires a five cent deposit on all soft
drink and beer containers, either bottles (including non-returnables) or
cans sold at the retail level.' 2 The petitioners sought a declaratory
judgment as to the ordinance's constitutionality, as well as an
injunction against its enforcement. 3
In affirming the lower court decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals
refused to accept any of the petitioners' allegations that the ordinance
was constitutionally infirm.' 4 Of the six constitutional areas of attack,
only the allegation that the ordinance was violative of the Commerce
Clause will receive extended treatment in this note.
First, the court rejected a due process challenge based upon a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In examining the ordinance in
view of the test for constitutionality under the Due Process Clause, the
court found "a clear relation between the mandatory deposit require-
ment and the object of reducing litter in Bowie."" Judge Eldridge,
9. Id.
10. Id. at 246, 335 A.2d at 689.
11. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In this case an allegedly valid
safety measure requiring a particular mud flap for trucks was found to constitute an
undue burden on interstate commerce because of the conflicting mud flap requirements
existing in neighboring states. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
12. BowiE, MD. ORDINANCES 0-4-71. This ordinance replaced a broader 1970 ordinance that
simply prohibited the sale of carbonated beverages in non-returnable bottles. Addi-
tionally, the new ordinance provides that anyone convicted of violating it shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and subject to a one hundred dollar fine and/or thirty days in jail.
13. 274 Md. at 232, 335 A.2d at 681.
14. Id. at 233, 335 A.2d at 681-82. This case was a consolidation of two suits, one brought
by bottlers and distributors and the other brought by local retailers.
15. Id. at 237, 335 A.2d at 684. Petitioners relied in part on Kokales v. City of Ann Arbor,
Docket No. 7753 (Washtenaw Co., Mich. Cir. Ct., 1974), where a similar deposit law was
struck down. The court noted that there existed virtually no relationship between the
health, safety and welfare of the community and the regulation, partly because the
speaking for the majority, stated that legislative exercise of the police
power is valid as long as it is not arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable,
and when valid, the wisdom of a law is not in question. 6 Additionally,
the court noted that special deference must be given to a legislative
enactment of a safety or environmental nature when the method has
not been-given an opportunity to "prove its worth." 7
Second, the court declined to accept the petitioners' contention that
the definition of "soft drink" was unconstitutionally vague." The
court did note, however, that some minimal difficulty might pros-
pectively be faced in determining whether specific products are "soft
drinks," but concluded that this possible minor confusion did not
violate the Due Process Clause. 9
Third, petitioners claimed a denial of equal protection,2" reasoning
that to regulate only soft drink and beer containers, instead of all
beverage containers, constituted an unreasonable classification. 2 The
court refused to accept this proposition, observing that classifications
need only rest upon some valid basis that has a substantial relation to
the purpose of the ordinance.22 The court then acknowledged the
necessary deference to legislative judgment,2 3 noting recent cases
which have interpreted similar statutes. In each of these cases, the
ordinance was only local and not statewide. The dissent of Judge O'Donnell in Bowie Inn
v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. at 240, 335 A.2d at 690, resting on the due process argument,
contended first that the evidence at the trial was not adequate to establish a real and
substantial relationship and second that the majority opinion neglected the established
state due process requirements by accepting "any consideration" as sufficient, instead of
requiring "real and substantial relations" between the means and the end. Id. at 261, 335
A.2d at 696.
16. 274 Md. at 235, 335 A.2d at 683; see Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Say-A-Lot Inc., 270
Md. 103, 106, 311 A.2d 242, 244 (1973); Salisbury Beauty School v. State Bd. of
Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973).
17. 274 Md. at 237-38, 335 A.2d at 684;see American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash and
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf. Fuller v. County
Comm'r of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 168, 133 A.2d 397 (1957).
18. 274 Md. at 239-40, 335 A.2d at 684-85. The court found that the forty-five word
definition was not vague since it did not fail "to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
19. 274 Md. at 240, 335 A.2d at 685; see Giant of Md. Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md.
501, 514-15, 298 A.2d 427, 434-35, appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1973).
20. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 274 Md. at 240, 335 A.2d at 686.
22. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), where the Court
enunciated the requirement that for a statute to succumb to an equal protection attack,
it must be "without any reasonable basis and therefore purely arbitrary." See generally
Matter of Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).
23. 274 Md. at 240-43, 335 A.2d at 686-87. The court also noted that the legislature need
not attack so massive a problem as litter in one grand sweep. Instead, different areas of
the problem can be treated by specific legislation. 274 Md. at 241, 335 A.2d at 686;
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, reh. denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955). See
Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1085
(1969).
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classification was found to be reasonable in light of the magnitude and
propensity with which such containers are littered.2 4
Fourth, the petitioners challenged the existence of the City of
Bowie's power to enact such an ordinance.2" This was dismissed by
noting that all municipalities have been given the power to regulate
garbage.26
Fifth, the petitioners alleged that the Maryland General Assembly, in
its supervisory role, had preempted the regulation of containers for
alcoholic beverages.2 7 This was dismissed by noting that the state
interest in regulating such containers concerns itself with neither
environmental waste control nor deposits required on sales at the retail
level.2 8
It was the petitioners' challenge that the ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause that deserves the most detailed and cautious
examination. Several tests purporting to determine whether a local
regulation creates an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce
have been developed over the years. 29  Examples of these include the
24. 274 Md. at 241-43, 335 A.2d 686-87. For other cases dealing with deposit laws see
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691
(1973); Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954);
Kokales v. City of Ann Arbor, Docket No. 7753, (Washtenaw Co., Mich. Cir. Ct., 1974).
See also E. CLAUSSEN, OREGON'S BOTTLE BILL: THE FIRST SIX MONTHS (U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency Pub. SW-109, 1973). For cases applying the equal protection test in
Maryland, see Maryland Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216
(1973); Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 259 Md. 595, 271 A.2d 144 (1970).
25. 274 Md. at 244, 335 A.2d at 689.
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2(14) (Supp. 1974). See City of Gaithersburg v.
Montgomery County, 271 Md. 505, 318 A.2d 509 (1974). Law of May 21, 1973, ch.
451, § 1, [ 1973] Laws of Md. 921, repealed MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 4, because the
exemption of some municipal corporations from MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2, violated
the Maryland Constitution, Art. XI-E, § 1.
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 185 & 186 (Supp. 1968).
28. 274 Md. at 248-49, 335 A.2d at 690.
29. Perhaps the first test was that in which Chief Justice Marshall examined the purpose of
an ordinance in light of an inherently exclusive national power over interstate commerce.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (dictum). Chief Justice Taney
applied a simpler test which held that all power to regulate interstate commerce was
concurrent, as long as Congress had remained dormant. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 579 (1847). Justice Curtis, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), combined Marshall's and Taney's approaches, establishing the test as first
requiring an examination of the subject matter and second requiring a determination of
whether that subject matter required a uniform national rule, which would make it
exclusively a national concern immune from local regulation. If local regulation was
deemed wiser, then local governments were given concurrent jurisdiction as long as
Congress had not preempted. Later decisions rested upon judicial determinations of
whether the local regulation had a direct or indirect effect on interstate commerce.
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888). This approach was attacked as being too
mechanical by Justice Stone's dissent in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
Stone eventually asserted and applied a non-mechanical balancing test that weighed the
local benefits against the burdens on interstate commerce. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The balancing test was later refined and intensified in
scope in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). The balancing test has
not always been found applicable and a partial return to mechanical tests occurred in
both Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), and
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S.
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"Cooley Test,"3 °  where the subject matter to be regulated by the
statute is examined and categorized as requiring either local or uniform
national control. If uniform national control is required, then the local
statute will be struck down.3' For a brief period of time the Supreme
Court applied the "direct-indirect test," allowing local regulations
which only indirectly affect interstate commerce to stand.3 2 These and
various other tests have been utilized to prevent a state from inflicting
burdens on those outside its borders who have no political redress
against the imposing state,3 3 as well as to preserve the free flow of
interstate commerce.34
Before applying any of the tests to a given statute, courts generally
examine certain factors which, if applicable, could invalidate the statute
without further scrutiny. First, the court must find the local statute to
be a valid exercise of the state police power.3" State courts have
unanimously upheld deposit laws as benefiting the health and safety of
the locality.3 6  Second, one locality cannot discriminate against
another, either patently 37  or disguised as an exercise of the police
power.3" Those challenging deposit laws often allege discrimination
based upon the increased costs to out-of-state bottlers and distribu-
tors. 39  This claim is rejected by noting that the increased costs
resulting merely from distance, not from state borderlines, affects both
in-state and out-of-state distributors identically. 40 Any preemption of
129 (1968). This led the Supreme Court to note recently in a general statement that any
of these tests can still be applied to determine if the local regulation constitutes an
unconstitutional burden. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
In addition to the varying application of the tests, the criteria to be examined in
applying each test has also varied. For instance, each court must determine whether or
not potential burdens on interstate commerce can be examined. Although most courts
have allowed potential burdens to be examined, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. at 775, some have limited the examination to only actually existing burdens. Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. at 448.
30. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
31. Id.
32. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
33. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); See also Dean Milk v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), which raises the additional question of whether
alternative, less burdensome methods of regulation should be considered. Possible
alternatives include statewide litter control acts, voluntary programs of litter control, and
various clean-up programs which most jurisdictions now have. The dissent of Judge
O'Donnell in Bowie Inn also suggested similar alternatives that might reduce litter
without so great an impact on the petitioners. 274 Md. at 259-60, 335 A.2d at 695-96.
34. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
35. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1951).
36. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 632, 517 P.2d
691, 698 (1973); Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271
(1954); Kokales v. City of Ann Arbor, Docket No. 7753 (Washtenaw Co., Mich. Cir. Ct.,
1974).
37. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
38. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
39. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618,641, 517 P.2d
691, 702 (1973).
40. Id. at 642-43, 517 P.2d at 703; Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. at 245, 335 A.2d at
688. See Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1762, 1777 (1974).
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the field by Congress is a third defect that would invalidate a local
ordinance affecting interstate commerce. 4 ' On the other hand, intent
manifested by Congress that a particular subject should be controlled
locally increases the presumption in favor of the local regulation's
validity.42 The indication by Congress that some environmental areas
should be the subject of local rather than national control has therefore
added strength to the existing presumption of validity that deposit laws
possess.
43
Once it has found the local regulation to be a non-discriminatory
exercise of the police power in an area of commerce that is free from
congressional restrictions, the Supreme Court has often gone one step
further and applied the balancing test.44 In utilizing this test, the court
weighs the putative benefits of the local ordinance against the burdens
it imposes on the free flow of interstate commerce, upholding the
statute if the benefits outweigh the burdens.45 Courts, however, have
refused to apply this increasingly popular balancing test to local
regulations dealing with the environment.
46
The validity of the ordinance in Bowie Inn, as has been the case with
other local environmental regulations, was not upheld by application of
the balancing test. However, the possibility that the balancing test
might be applied in the future makes it important to determine both
the reason for and the effect of the non-application of the balancing
41. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
42. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See also Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), where the Court upheld a congressional declaration
that regulation of insurance is a local matter.
43. Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. at 245, 335 A.2d at 688. The Maryland Court of
Appeals relied heavily on Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960), where the Supreme Court noted that Congress had indicated that air pollution
was a problem properly controlled by local governments. This same rationale was applied
in American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 633-34, 517
P.2d 691, 699 (1973), where the court noted that:
Congress has directed that the states take primary responsibility for action in this
field. By enacting the Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 USC § 3251 et seq.
(sic.) (1970), Congress specifically recognized that the proliferation of new
packages for consumer products has severely taxed our disposal resources and
blighted our landscapes. It disclaimed federal preemption and assigned to local
government the task of coping with the problem with limited federal fiscal
assistance.
See also Environmental Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371 et seq. (1970);
Federal Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970). But see more recently 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. I, 1972).
44. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970), where the Court stated that a statute incidentally affecting
commerce "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142. But see Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
45. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526 (1959), where the Court noted
that increased costs alone are not a sufficient burden on interstate commerce to
invalidate a local safety ordinance.
46. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); American Can Co.
v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). Contra,
Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975).
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test. The simple question is: why would courts examining local
environmental statutes not apply the balancing test? A first reaction
would be that such a test is simply inappropriate. Can any benefit to
the environment ever be measured against an economic burden to
interstate commerce? Few courts have expressly mentioned the
difficulty of balancing intangibles, but it seems to represent one strong
reason for not applying the balancing test.4 7
A second reason for non-application of the balancing test is that
some courts have limited its scope to transportation" cases, such as
those involving the length of trains4 9 or the required safety equipment
on trucks."0 Although the test was developed in transportation cases,
its scope has not been limited solely to them.5 ' It is only reasonable to
assume that valid balances between benefits and burdens can be made
in areas other than those concerning the safety of interstate transporta-
tion.
The possibility that the court could become a "super legislature" is a
third explanation for not utilizing the balancing test. 2 However, the
restraint that the courts have exercised in overruling acts of legislatures,
coupled with the presumption of constitutionality afforded safety
statutes, should eliminate any separation of powers problems.5 3 Since
courts can examine regulations to determine whether there exists
enough of a "real and substantial relationship" to withstand a due
process challenge, why must they then stop and defer to the legislature
without considering the burdens on interstate commerce?
A fourth reason for non-application of the balancing test arises when
Congress has expressed its desire to have local instead of national
regulation. 4  Such congressional expression eliminates the need to
balance. The Supreme Court prefers to base its decisions on a finding of
congressional mandate for two reasons. On one hand, it enables the
Court to insulate itself from allegations of usurpation of legislative
authority. On the other hand, a decision based on the finding of a
congressional mandate allows Congress to reverse through subsequent
47. Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For an excellent
discussion of balancing intangibles, see American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 631-32, 517 P.2d 691, 697-98 (1973). Cf. Procter and
Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1975); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the
Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762, 1779 (1974).
48. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 631, 517 P.2d
691, 698 (1973); 87 HARV. L. REV. at 1778; Note, State and Local Regulation of
Non-Returnable Beverage Containers, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 536, 549.
49. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
50. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 350 U.S. 520 (1959).
51. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of
Detroit, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975).
52. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
53. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
54. See note 43 supra. The Oregon court relied heavily upon the congressional mandate in
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 633, 517 P.2d
691, 699 (1973).
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enactments any misinterpretations the Court may have made as to
congressional intent.55 This fourth rationale has been given added
impetus in deposit law cases as a result of legislation encouraging local
control of environmental matters.5 6
Finally, a question often arises as to whether both potential and
existing burdens should be balanced.5 " Courts may be hesitant to apply
the balancing test because clear precedent is lacking as to whether both
types of burdens are to be considered. The judiciary can avoid the need
to determine which burdens to balance by deferring to legislative
judgment.5 s
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the Bowie ordinance did
not constitute an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
While the court did not rely upon the balancing test for its holding, it
did apply the test in an arguendo manner. In this dictum application of
the test, the court considered only existing and not potential burdens
on interstate commerce. 9 The majority found the balance to be
clearly in favor of the Bowie ordinance, but the opinion contained little
discussion of exactly what factors were weighed. The retailers claimed
that their loss of business to non-restricted retailers in neighboring
jurisdictions, combined with the increased handling and storage costs,
as well as the unavailability of certain products in returnable containers,
constituted an undue burden.6" The distributors and bottlers claimed
that the increased transportation costs, the strong consumer preference
for non-returnable containers, and the tailoring of a unique distribution
scheme for a market as small as Bowie all placed unconstitutional
burdens on interstate commerce.
61
The court answered these allegations briefly, explaining that the
Bowie ordinance did not prohibit any soft drink or beverage container
55. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), where the Court upheld a
seemingly burdensome state insurance law because Congress had determined that
insurance should be controlled locally.
56. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 633-34, 517
P.2d 691, 699 (1973). See note 43 supra.
57. Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Court
balanced potential future burdens that could constitute an undue burden on interstate
commerce, with Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), where the
Court only considered those burdens on interstate commerce that were actually existing.
58. See Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945). Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960).
59. 274 Md. at 246-47, 335 A.2d at 689.
60. Id. at 244-46, 335 A.2d at 688-89. See Brief for Appellant at 44-46, Bowie Inn v. City of
Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679. For a detailed discussion of the burdens which
deposit laws impose on commerce, see American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 634-40, 517 P.2d 691, 698-701 (1973). A "benefit versus
burdens" analysis of deposit laws can be found in McCaull, Back to Glass, 16
ENVIRONMENT 6 (1974); Note, State and Local Regulations of Non-Returnable Beverage
Containers, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 536.
61. 274 Md. at 244, 335 A.2d at 688. Substantial evidence was presented challenging the
effectiveness of such anti-litter laws, but this evidence was primarily aimed at the due
process issue. But see McCaull, Back to Glass, 16 ENVIRONMENT 6, 8 (1974).
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from being sold, but merely required that a deposit be charged and
refunded on all such containers sold at the retail level in Bowie.62 The
court further labeled most of the alleged burdens as merely "specula-
tive." 6 3  Against these burdens the court simply balanced the putative
benefits of a "substantially cleaner environment"6 4 and, although the
court referred to the balancing test, it is important to note that it did
not base its decision on it. Instead, the court relied on the test in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,6" which held as valid any
"[s]tate regulation, based on the police power, which does not
discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its
required uniformity." 6 6
The impact of Bowie Inn cannot yet be measured.6 7 By its decision,
the Maryland Court of Appeals has certainly given a boost to
the legislative efforts of environmentalists. However, since the court did
not reject the balancing test, but merely chose not to apply it in its
holding, environmentalists could discover that an initial victory does
not guarantee that the battle has been won. While the court has
apparently given local groups the opportunity to protect environmental
interests through the passage of deposit laws, it has left the door open
for subsequent attacks on such laws. In future cases, the court may
choose to rely on the balancing test,6" particularly if several localities
have enacted conflicting deposit laws. This possible conflict is best
illustrated by Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,6 9 in which the United
States Supreme Court struck down a safety statute requiring a
particular type of mud flap on trucks because of existing incompatible
mud flap requirements in other jurisdictions. The Court found that the
burdens, which occurred solely because of the competing requirements,
placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Bibb
reasoning can be applied by analogy to local deposit ordinances. If such
ordinances are enacted containing conflicting methods of regulation,
such as banning different types of containers, then the burden placed
upon the bottlers, manufacturers and retailers could increase. These
increased burdens caused by the conflicting requirements could, in
turn, lead to the invalidation of the deposit laws by application of the
balancing test.
The federal government, through the Environmental Protection
Agency, has proposed a system of regulation for the sale of soft drink
62. 274 Md. at 246, 335 A.2d at 688.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
66. 362 U.S. at 448. This seems akin to the examination utilized in pre-balancing test cases,
such as South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
67. It is noteworthy that this decision represents the first local deposit law to successfully
withstand appellate scrutiny. See Kokales v. City of Ann Arbor, Docket No. 7753
(Washtenaw Co., Mich. Cir. Ct., 1974).
'68. The balancing test has been applied to environmental statutes. See Procter and Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975).
69. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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and beer containers on federal installations which is similar to the
Bowie Ordinance.7" Additionally, a few Maryland counties have
enacted varying deposit laws,7 and there are proposals pending on
both the state and local level.72 Before enacting any deposit law, the
locality should consider the advantages of adopting a Bowie-type
ordinance. First, the Bowie ordinance has already passed an exhaustive
court challenge. Second, the legislative intent of benefiting the
environment would be furthered by complementary regulations.
Finally, complementary ordinances could reduce the burdens on
commerce. For example, by applying economic principles, it can be
argued that uniform deposit laws would reduce the competitive
disadvantage to which Bowie retailers may be subjected by putting a
greater number of retailers under similar regulations. Additionally, the
burden on manufacturers and distributors could be reduced as a result
of the increased size of the regulated market.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has given local environmentally
concerned governments an opportunity to develop their own deposit
laws and to prove the effectiveness of such legislation. However,
without cooperative planning between local governments, aimed at
establishing a uniform complementary method of regulation, future
deposit laws may be held to be an unconstitutional burden on the flow
of interstate commerce.
Michael L. Ross
70. See 40 Fed. Reg. 52967 (1973).
71. See Montgomery County, Md., Bill 66-74, Nov. 18, 1975 (mandatory deposit bill to take
effect Jan. 1, 1978); Howard County, Md., Bill 7, July 2, 1971.
72. Approximately thirty-five bills have been introduced calling for statewide regulation of
bottles and litter. None have been successful.
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